<Five Essays on renewal>

Renewal. Its problem and its method[[1]](#footnote-1)

Renewal is the common call in our suffering present and in the whole sphere of European culture. The war, which has spoiled it since 1914 and has only chosen the more “subtle” coercive means of psychic torture and morally depraving economic hardship instead of the military ones since 1918, has uncovered the inner untruth, senselessness of this culture. This uncovering simply means the inhibition of its proper momentum though. A nation, humanity lives and acts in the fullness of strength, if it is carried by a belief in itself, keeping it going, and in a nice and good sense of its cultural life; if it thus does not only live as such, but lives towards something that is big in its view and [if it] is satisfied by its progressing successes in actualizing true and increasing values. To be a worthy member of such humanity, to contribute to such a culture, to add to its values, raising the heart, is every capable man’s luck, and raises him above his individual sorrows and adversities.

We, (the) widest parts of the population, have lost this belief, that has raised us and our fathers, and that was transferred on the nations, which, like the Japanese one, only recently have followed European cultural activities.

[4] If it had become tottering prior to the war already, then it has now broken down completely. We face this fact as free persons; it must determine us in practice.

And afterwards we say: Something new must come; it must grow in us and through us ourselves, through us as members of humanity living in this world, creating it through us, and us through it. Shall we wait and see whether this culture becomes healthy on its own accord in its contingently playing with forces creating and destroying values? Shall we endure the “sinking of the occident” as a fate? This fate only exists, if we watch it passively – could watch it passively. But neither those proclaiming this fate to us are able to.

We are persons, free willing subjects, actively intervening in their surrounding world, co-creating it constantly. Whether we like it or not, whether bad or good, we do this. Are we unable to do it in a rational way, are reason and capability not in my power?

These are chimerical aims, this is what the pessimists and “political realists” will certainly object. As it is an already unattainable ideal for the single one to make his individual life a rational life, how are we supposed to intend something like that for community life, the national one, nay, that of whole occidental humanity?

Meanwhile, what would we say to a person, who is willing to give up the ethical goal due to the unattainability of the ethical ideal and not to take up the ethical fight? We know that this fight, as far as it is a serious and constant one, has some importance creating a value at all events, nay, that it already raises in itself the struggling personality onto the step of true humanity. Who will on top of that deny the option of a constant ethical progress under the rational ideal’s guidance?

We may not consider exactly the same as impossible without hesitation for the “men in large” as well, for further and most farthest communities, without being deterred by some weak pessimism and an idealless “realism”, and we will have to accept the same fighting mood for arriving at some better humanity and a truly human culture as an absolute ethical demand.

[5] Thus a natural emotion speaks in advance, which obviously has its roots in that Platonic analogy of single man and community. This analogy though is not in the least the ingenious idea of some philosopher, going far beyond natural thinking or even being extravagant, but is nothing more than the expression of some everyday apperception, naturally growing from the actualities of human life. It then shows itself as constantly determining in its naturalness, as for example in almost all national and global political value-judgments and as a motive for corresponding actions. But are such natural apperceptions and emotion statements carried by them a sufficient basis for rational reforms of community; and now even for the biggest of all reforms, supposed to radically renew some complete cultural humanity as the European one? The belief pervading us – our culture should not be left unchanged, it may and must be reformed through human reason and human will – can only then not in mere fantasy, but in reality “move mountains,” if it is implemented in sober thoughts being rationally comprehensible, if it brings to complete determinateness and clarity the essence and option of its goal in them, and of the method actualizing it. And it thereby first of all creates for itself a foundation of rational justification. It is only such intellectual clarity that can call for joyful work, [that] can bestow on the will the determination and the prevailing strength for a liberating act, only its cognition can become a solid common property, so that eventually the mountains are moved with the thousandfold help of the ones being convinced by such rationality, i.e. the merely emotional movement of renewal is changed in the process of renewal itself.

But such clarity is not in the least easily to be gained. That skeptical pessimism and the shamelessness of political Sophism thus fatefully reigning our time, which only uses socioethical argumentation as a pretext for the egotistic purposes of some completely degenerated nationalism, were not at all possible, if the concepts of community that have grown naturally were not afflicted with dark horizons in spite of their naturalness, with entangled and covered mediacies, the clarifying analysis of which completely surpasses the strength of untrained thinking. Only strict science is able to [6] create here a secure method and firm results; only this can thus do the theoretical groundwork, on which a rational reform of culture depends.

But we are here in a bad situation; since we are trying in vain to find the science that was supposed to serve us. We are getting on thereby in the same way as in the whole other practice of the community life, namely, if we wish to base our social political, foreign political, national judgments in a conscientious way on expert knowledge, and now look for some scientific lecture, able to liberate us from the primitive level of some instinctive, vague traditionalist imagination and acting in this fateful world of community life. Our age is rich in big and serious sciences. We have “exact” natural sciences and with their help that much appreciated technique of nature, that has given its enormous superiority to modern civilization, but certainly also leading to heavily lamented disadvantages. But however, science has enabled true practical rationality in this naturally technical sphere of human acting, and it gave the model doctrine on how science as such was supposed to become the light of practice. But a rational science of man and human community, causing some rationality in social, in political acting, and a rational political technique, is missing indeed.

Exactly the same holds true as well with regard to the problems of renewal we are that much interested in. Describing it in a more concise way, we are lacking the science, that would have attempted to perform that for the idea of man (and thereby for the pair of ideas, being *a priori* inseparable: single man and community), which pure mathematics of nature has attempted and also performed in the main parts for the idea of nature. As the latter idea – nature as such as a general form – encompasses the *universitas* of natural sciences, thus the idea of the essence of mind – and more specifically of the rational being, of man – the *universitas* of all, and especially all human sciences of the mind. While mathematics of nature on the one hand explicates the apriori necessities, encompassed in such essential components of nature as such (“*natura formaliter spectata*”) in its apriori disciplines of time, space, motion, moving forces, [7] it enables empirical natural sciences by applying it to the actuality of given nature, with rational, namely mathematical method. It thus delivers together with its apriori principles of rationalizing the empirical.

On the other side we possibly have many and fruitful sciences related to the realm of the mind, or rather, of humanity, but they are empirical and “merely” empirical sciences indeed. The enormous wealth of facts, being ordered temporally, morphologically, inductively or in practical terms, remains within them without any bond of de facto rationality. The parallel apriori science, so to say the *mathesis* of mind and humanity is missing here; The scientifically developed system of purely rational “apriori” truths, rooted in the “essence” of man, that would, as pure logos of method, insert theoretical rationality into the empiricism of humanities in a similar sense and would enable a rational explanation of empirical facts in a similar sense, as pure mathematics of nature has enabled empirical science of nature as a mathematically theorizing and thereby rationally explaining one.

But on the humanistic side this is not a mere rational “explanation” as it is for nature. A quite peculiar kind of rationalizing the empiric emerges here: The normative judgment according to general norms belonging to the apriori essence of “rational” humanity, and the guidance of the actual practice itself according to exactly such norms, to which the rational norms of practical guidance themselves also belong.

The state of affairs on both sides, simply due to the different kinds of essence of natural and mental realities, are basically different as such, therefore the shapes of rationalizing the actual, to be demanded on both sides, are anything but of the same style. It will be fine to make this clear immediately here in a short subsequent contrasting, in order to not be inhibited from our further analyses of renewal through naturalistic prejudices, and to approach at the same time the methodical peculiarity of, as we said in advance, the missing science, towards which such analyses strive.

Nature is essentially a merely actual existence and thereby [8] a fact from merely external experience. A fundamental consideration of nature as such thus leads *a priori* towards rationality of externalities, namely, towards essential laws of the spatiotemporal form and beyond that only towards some necessity of exact inductive regular order of the spatiotemporally distributed – that, which we are used to call “causal” order of the law as such.

In contrast to that, completely other forms, completely other most general determinations of the single realities’ essence and the combination’s essential forms are encompassed in the mind’s specific sense. Apart from the spatiotemporal form having an essentially different sense in the mind’s realm (e.g. in history) than in physical nature, we need to point out here that every single reality of the mind has its internality, a “life of consciousness” being encompassed in itself, related to an “Ego”, so to say as a pole centering all single acts of consciousness, whereby these acts are connected with “motivation.”

Furthermore, the single separate realities, or rather, their Ego subjects, enter into relations of reciprocally understanding (“empathy”) one another; they institute (immediately or mediately) a completely new form of unification of realities through “social” consciousness acts: The form of community, mentally united through inner moments, through intersubjective acts and motivations.

And one more most important thing: Differences of reason and unreason, of the “right” and “not right” thinking, valuing and willing belong to the acts and their motivations.

We may indeed in a certain way consider realities of the mind as well (as a second nature) in relations of externality: the consciousness as an external annex to physical realities (the respective physical bodies); men and animals as mere happenings in the space, “in” nature. But the inductive regularities showing themselves as well then are not, as is essentially accepted for physical nature, indicators of exact laws, of laws determining the objectively true “nature” of these realities, i.e., determining it according to the essential kind of such realities in rational truth. In other words: Here, where the peculiar essence of the mental thing declares itself in the internality of conscious life, does not lie [9] any rational explanation on the way of inductively-causal consideration, from *a priori* reasons (so that it is countersensical to look for such an [explanation] in the way of our naturalistic psychology). A going back to the determining essential laws is simply needed for actual rationalization of the empirical (quite as in the case of nature here), that is, of the specific mentality, as the world of internalities. The normal shapes of “reason” now also belong to the shapes of consciousness, or rather, of motivation that are *a priori* predelineated as possible in the essence of human mentality, and the option is given *a priori* as well, to think generally in freedom and to determine oneself practically and generally according to apriori normative laws cognized by oneself. Accordingly, as we predicted above, unlike the case of nature we do thus not only have a so-called “theoretical” judgment-formation in the special sense, namely directed towards “mere facts of the existence” (matter of fact), within the realm of human mind. And accordingly we do not merely have the tasks of these facts’ rationalization with the help of so-called “explaining theories”, and according to some apriori discipline exploring the essence of the mind in a purely objective way. Rather, a new kind of judging and rationalizing all mental emerges here: that one according to norms, or rather, according to normative apriori disciplines of reason, of the logical, valuing and practical reason. A subject though cognizing the norm and in consequence freely acting, follows the judging reason in praxi or may follow in freedom. Accordingly the tasks of a rational guiding the practice indeed emerge in the mental sphere, that is, once again a new way of possible rationalizing mental facts on a scientific basis, namely through a previous apriori discipline of the norms of practical rational guiding.

If we now return to our proper problem again, then we must understand that indeed the present, merely empirical sciences of man (as our historical sciences of culture or even modern, merely inductive psychology) do not have to offer anything of that, which we, striving for renewal, need; and that actually only that apriori science of the human mentality’s essence – if it were there – would come into consideration as a rational helper. First of all we find that sciences of mere facts are excluded for us in advance. [10] – Our questions on renewal indeed are built on mere factualness, since they relate to present culture and especially to that of the European cultural circle. But the facts are thereby judged in a valuing way, are subject to testing reason by norms; The question is, how a reform of this negatively valuable cultural life is to be initiated in order to make it a life of reason. Every deeper sense investigation leads back here to fundamental questions of practical reason, concerning the individual and the community and their rational life in essential and purely formal generality, some generality leaving all empirical factualness, all contingent concepts far behind.

A few things are sufficient to give a reason for that, and to make obvious thereby at the same time, that precisely that science of man’s essence as such was exactly the one, we needed for help.

If we submit our culture, that is, our humanity cultivating itself and its surrounding world, to a rejecting judgment, then this implies that we believe in some “good” humanity as an ideal option. Implicitly the belief in “true and actual” humanity as an objectively accepted idea, in the sense of which the natural aim of our striving for a reform must be the reforming of de facto culture, is implied as being within our judgment. The first sense investigations thus need to be directed towards a clear draft of this idea. If we do not take the fantastic way of utopia, if we rather aim at sober objective truth, then this draft must have the form of a purely conceptual determination of the essence, likewise the options of the idea’s actualization needed to be considered *a priori* as pure options of the essence in scientific strictness at first. What special, standard shapes were possible and necessary then within some humanity compliant with this idea of true humanity, for the single persons constituting it as community members as well as for the different types of associations, community institutions, cultural activities, etc. – all that would belong into a scientific analysis of the essence of the idea of some true or rational humanity, and would lead towards single studies branching off in manifold ways.

A brief consideration already clarifies that the whole kind and the special themes of the studies necessary in our interest are indeed determined in advance by the formally general [11] structures, which our culture beyond its factualness had in common with infinitely many cultures ideally possible. All concepts an exploration going into depths, that is, into the fundamental, encounters here, are of apriori, in a good sense formal generality. Thus the concept of man as such as a rational being, the concept of the community’s member and of community itself and no less all special concepts of community as family, people, state, etc. Likewise the concepts of culture and the special cultural systems science, art, religion, etc. (likewise in normative shapes: “true”, “actual” science, art, religion).

The original and classical educational institution for pure research of the essence and for the appertinent essential abstraction (abstraction by way of “pure”, “apriori” concepts) is mathematics, but such a kind of research and method is not in any way bound to it. Even if we are not used to performing such abstraction in the mental sphere, and to exploring the mind’s and reason’s essential necessities, still something like that is well possible; nay, we are often enough within the apriori already – although not consciously and methodically. For wherever we get into fundamental considerations, there our view exclusively rests on pure form on its own accord. The methodically-conscious abstracting from the empirical content of the respective concepts, their conscious shaping as “pure” concepts may be left out; still this content does not play an attend motivating role in our thinking. When considering community as such, the state, the people as such, likewise man, citizen and the like, and that belonging to the reasonable, the “genuineness” in such generalities – then obviously all empirically de facto differences of bodiliness and mentality, of concrete earthly circumstances of life, and the like, are in the same sense “undetermined” and “freely variable” as the concrete features and possible empirical bindings of unities in the ideal consideration of the arithmetician or the items of an algebraist. Whether man empirically has perceptual organs, eyes, ears, etc. formed in this or that way, whether two or x many eyes, whether these or those organs of a locomotion, whether legs, wings, and the like, this is quite out of the question and indeterminately-open in fundamental considerations. Only certain forms of [12] bodiliness and of the mentality of the soul are presupposed and lie within view; it is the task of scientific essential research to present them as *a priori* necessary and to fix them conceptually. This holds true for the whole conceptual system branching off many times, which, as a formal framework, goes through all humanistic thinking and specifically thus through the studies of the normative style as well, being in question for us.

If now an apriori science of the essential forms and essential laws of the mind, and, which we are interested in above all, of reasonable mentality, has not arrived at a systematic formation yet, if we are unable to draw upon some stock of cognition lying at hand here in order to lend a rational basis to our striving for renewal – what shall we do? Shall we thus again proceed as in political practice, if, for example, we as citizens prepare ourselves for voting? Shall we thus only judge according to instinct and tact, according to overlooking suppositions? Suchlike may be completely justified, where the day demands a decision, and the action is concluded with it. But in our case, where our care is directed towards something temporally infinite and to the eternal in the temporal – to the future of humanity, the becoming of true humanity, for which we feel responsible indeed ourselves -, and for us, as scientifically educated ones, knowing as well that only science is the basis of final decisions of reason, and only [science] can be that authority eventually prevailing – there cannot be any doubt for us, as to what is our task. We are supposed to search for scientific ways on our own accord, which unfortunately no prior science has prepared, and to begin in earnest with methodical and problem analytical prior considerations on our own accord with preliminary trains of thought of any kind, showing themselves to be first necessities.

The considerations that have been made up till now are in this sense already preparing and hopefully not useless prior considerations. Not useless above all, since they have shown to us in methodical regard, that only a way of consideration that may be called an essential consideration, can be actually fruitful and that only this can open the way towards some rational science not only of humanity as such, but also of its “renewal”. If we also bring to our mind, that a “renewal” in essential necessity belongs to the development of [13] man and of humanity towards true humanity, then this shows that the institution of this science was the necessary supposition for a true renewal, nay, it would be a first beginning of its enactment itself. Anyway, the only thing we can do now and initially, is its preparation.

We dare attempt in our next article to follow a series of fundamental trains of thought by approaching the idea of true humanity and renewal, [trains of thought] which, performed in a completely conscious way in the essential attitude, are supposed to show in a more determined way, how we consider beginnings – beginnings feeling their way – of soberly scientific and thereby apriori cultural investigations of the normative – socio-ethical – sphere. The interest must be directed above all towards problem and method in our scientific situation.

The method of the inquiry into essences[[2]](#footnote-2)

By inquiry into essences we understand the way of purely and consequently performing the method of the contemplation of ideas, already introduced into science by Socrates-Plato, and of the predicative cognition of ideas, also called apriori cognition. We are thereby far from taking over any philosophical interpretations, that is, from burdening ourselves with any (whether Platonic or post-Platonic) metaphysical inheritance that is historically cleft to the concept of “idea” and the “apriori”. Practically everybody knows the apriori from pure mathematics. He knows – and acknowledges – the mathematical way of thinking – prior to the following metaphysical or empiricist interpretations, that do not concern the peculiar essence of the methodical kind itself.

We orientate our concept of the apriori by this [way of thinking]. Speaking in a quite general way, we can approach every experienced reality and likewise every reality invented in free fantasy intuition, in short, [14] every “empirical thing” in the same way (and thereby rise in the same way to its apriori), as the “pure” mathematician does with regard to all the empirical bodies, spatial shapes, temporal dimensions, motions, etc. that serve him during his thinking. But especially there, where he “originally” creates his thoughts, particularly his elementary concepts – the primal material for all his formations of concepts – or rather, where he “gets clear” about these concepts, i.e., goes back from the empty knowledge of the word towards the “original” true concepts. In all of that – and this depicts a basic character of all “apriori” thinking – the mathematician avoids all judgment on real actuality. Actualities of experience may serve him indeed, but they do not serve and are not accepted by him as actualities. They are accepted by him only as arbitrary examples to be arbitrarily changed in free fantasy, for which therefore actualities of fantasy could serve quite as well, and as a rule even do serve him. The thematic sphere of purely mathematical thinking is simply not actual nature, but possible nature as such: and this means some nature, which could be as such imaginable in a univocal sense. The freedom of mathematics is the freedom of free fantasy and of pure fantasy thinking. And mathematics’ rigid restriction to laws is no less the binding restriction appertinent to such fantasy thinking itself: namely, insofar as mathematical fantasy is still restricted in all its voluntarily fantasizing formations by the consequent will to further keep in the identical sense that, which once had been posited as invented actuality.

Explained more closely, the opinion of this self-normativization of pure fantasy thinking is the following: To practice mathematical (and thus as such apriori) thinking, i.e. to not devote oneself in a playful way to the kaleidoscopic chaos of unconnected fancies, but to create shapes in a fantasizing way, to posit them as possible actualities and to keep them up from then on as identical ones. This implies: to allow to oneself volatile variations of fantasy only in such directions, which could make univocally imaginable and cognizable every thing that has once been posited in a fantasizing way, as the same possible actuality and as an [actuality] that is compatible with every other posited thing. In this sense, mathematics does not deal with actual spaces, bodies, planes, etc. as belonging to some de [15] facto natural actuality, but with those being imaginable as such and thereby univocally conceivable, with “ideally possible ones”. Such pure fantasy thinking though is not dependent on the contingent singular options that come to be respectively shaped in fantasy, but with their help it rises in the general thinking on essence and originally in the general intuition of essence towards the pure “ideas” or “essences” and “essential laws”. From there it goes over to the mediate consequent conclusions that are to be verified in intuitive deduction, and makes the infinite realm of mathematic theory accessible to itself. The basic concepts the mathematician creates originally, in general intuition, are pure generalities directly viewed from fantasized details, which are distinct due to the free variation of such details as a general sense identically going through them, and which singularize in them (the Platonic *methexis* in original intuition).

Thus the single pure option of a body for example, showing us a clear and univocal fantasy, through free variation, that is, in the consciousness of some volatile continuability of such a variation, at the same time results in the original consciousness of an open infinity of optional bodies. The identical that is kept in such a variation evidently emerges in the overlooking transgression of the open infinity of variants as some transgressing identical thing, as its general “essence”, its “idea”. Or, which is the same, seen intuitively, this leads to their common “pure concept”, that of a body as such, which is thus related to this infinity of singular ideal options as towards its “extent”.

Mathematics operates with such originally created concepts, creates its immediate essential laws (so-called axioms) as “necessary and in the strict sense general” truths, “of which no exception as possible is allowed at all” (Kant). It views them as general essential relationships that are producible in absolute identity for all conceivable singularizations of its pure concepts – for those firmly closed infinities of variation or apriori “extents” – and as that evidently cognizable. It furthermore creates its theories and its deduced “doctrines” from them in deductive intuition (apriori “evidence” of a necessary consequence), again viewable as ideal identities in the volatile [16] repetition of creation.

Every attendant positing of experienced actualities that judges – as it is included in all empirical concepts, for example the natural historical concepts lion, salamander, violet and the like, and thereby also in all empirically general sentences – remains strictly inhibited. That, which is determined by mathematical thinking, is in this sense *a priori* contrary to all *empeiria* indeed. But whatever is conceivable as a singularization of its “pure” concepts, that is, whatever is supposed to keep up the identity of possible being, is subject to the respective “purely-conceptual” or “essential” laws.

The application on the de facto actuality rests on every actuality encompassing pure options in an evident way. Each may be transferred with its whole constitutive content of determination so to say into pure fantasy, simply through switching-off (freely avoiding) all positings of actuality. The actual then becomes a case of pure option, next to endlessly many other equal options. Accordingly, every actuality, given by experience and judged through experiential thinking is, as to the justification of such judgments, subject to the unconditional norm that it has to conform above all to the apriori “conditions of possible experience” and of possible experiential thinking; that is, to the conditions of their pure option, their imaginableness and positability as objectivity of a univocally identical sense. The mathematics of nature enounces such apriori conditions for nature (the actuality of physical experience) in all its sentences – it enounces them “*a priori*”, i.e., without ever speaking of “the” nature as a fact. The relation of the facts is the matter of the application, which is *a priori* always possible and in this option evidently understandable.

And now we need to say as such: to judge actualities according to the laws of their pure option or according to “essential laws”, according to apriori laws, is a universal, indeed necessary task to be related to any kind of actualities. Every actuality has its own “essence” as its rational content, each one enables and demands its rational (“exact”) cognition. This insofar though as its pure essence is classified into an essential science, into a self-contained realm of pure rationality (a realm of objectively appertinent essential [17] truths, and insofar as secondly the application of this essential science now also enables a rational theoretic cognition of the given actuality and the whole realm of actuality, to which it belongs. Scientific cognition of empirical actuality can only become “exact”, can only receive true rationality, by relating back this actuality to its essential option: that is, through its application of the respective essential science.

True rationality as cognition from “principles” is simply cognition from essential laws, it is a cognition of the actualities from the laws of their pure option – as we may learn from the prototype of exact natural science, which is based upon the application of pure mathematics. For that, which we have made clear at mathematical thinking and the mathematical natural science, holds true in general for any kind of objective spheres. Some optional apriori thinking belongs to each, then an apriori science and the same functional application of this science – if we simply give the same sober, only important sense to the apriori everywhere. There is absolutely no reason for viewing the method of apriori thinking, as we have shown it [the method] in its general essential features at the mathematical thinking, as some exclusive peculiarity of the mathematical realm. Nay, supposing such a limitation would be downright absurd in view of the general essential relation between actuality and possibility, of experience and pure fantasy. The way into the realm of ideal and pure option, and thereby into that of apriori thinking is open from every concrete actuality and from every single feature to be actually experienced at it and experienceable. And according to the most general, the (essentially Socratic-Platonic) method of creation, as of the single pure options, thus of the endless “extents” of such options, going over into one another in varying change, is everywhere the same; and then of course the originally intuitive formation of corresponding pure generalities of the essence, of “ideas” (essence, pure concepts) and essential laws.

Certainly we need to expect, that is, to not overlook, that depending on the starting points, on the ideas resulting thereby and the apriori realms resulting under the aspect of essential coherence, [18] also the special methods and the whole type of apriori theories can and must turn out quite differently.

Apriori sciences, at least possible ones and therefore to be put into action, thus do not only exist naturally and from nature’s peculiar essential forms, but also from the personal mind, the individual and social one, and not only of mere physical things within the frame of nature, but also of organisms and of “two-sided” psychophysical realities; and not only of all of this, but also of cultural objects, of cultural values of every category that is to be formed purely.

We should not fail to notice thereby that we have to differ between specific mathematics of nature (pure geometry, pure doctrine of the time, pure kinetics, etc.), which we preferably had in view above, and purely formal mathematics (analysis, doctrine of manifoldness, etc.), which, despite its constant application in exact natural science still does not belong to nature specifically, but taken universally as a “formal ontology”[[3]](#footnote-3)\* belongs in the same way, that is, at the same time, to all objects and objective realms possible as such. In the same way we take heed of other apriori disciplines that are formal in a similar sense, which are historically present in drafts and first indications like the formal logic of the sentences, the apriori morphology of meanings [[4]](#footnote-4)\*\* (pure grammar), the general theory of reason, but are still waiting for a new, systematic treatment that is completely conscious in the peculiar sense of the apriori method. Anyway, it is time now, to throw away old prejudices and to approach the big, most necessary task of grounding all apriori sciences, and to thereby satisfy at the same time the full and true idea of some *mathesis universalis* (going far beyond Leibniz’ idea). Indeed that all possible apriori disciplines form a coherent “*universitas*”, a most inner unity within the manifoldness; that they are coherent in an apriori science of primal sources of all possible consciousness and being – in a “transcendental phenomenology”[[5]](#footnote-5)\*\*\*, as [19] the essentially necessary branches of which they need to be treated – it is not the place here to show this.

If for example we proceed in the above described apriori method with regard to man, then the transition from the empeiria into the realm of pure options as highest fundamental unity results in the pure idea of an animal, bodily-psychic essence as such. This highest idea as such grows with the help of the freest variation of all moments, able to be verified in the exemplarily functioning single man as such. This idea’s pure differentiation – of course not performed in empty verbal thinking, but intuitively in corresponding restriction of variation – as a special one and again pure kind results in the idea (not the “ideal”!) of man and in contrast to that, as a correlating idea, that of the “mere” animal. If we then differentiate man for example according to the type of his possible personal life, if we form the idea of professional life and its possible types and the like, then these are examples of ever new apriori differentiations. These are exactly analogous differentiations as that of the idea shape as such in closed shape, then again straight shape, triangle, etc. One’s own, quite extensive (literarily still missing) investigations are needed, in order to subordinate the exact essential content of the idea of “*animal*”, together with the bodiliness and “soul” essentially belonging to it, systematically and intuitively according to elementary concepts and laws to essential determination; and then to more specifically perform this same for the distinguished essential shape “man” that is so much more abundant in its further differentiations, with the ideas of reason (or rather “unreason”) belonging to it.

Of course a quite general, still undifferentiated, although pure idea, e.g. that of man, functions as guiding thought at the beginning of some essential investigation of any realm, for example of humanity. We cannot deny that we are able to gain essential cognition with insight, if only the process actually draws from the depths of seeing an essence and does not stick to empty verbal thoughts, even without the touching elementary analysis having approached the intuitive exhibition of last elementary ideas coming from the highest idea, undifferentiated in itself. Considered more closely, even mathematics [20] has not completely succeeded in this: therefore the struggle for its last foundations and the burden of “paradoxes”.

But exactly this indication may serve to arouse the conviction, the deeper grounding of which would lead as too far here: namely that all cognitions not gained from the latter and from the original sources of most perfect intuition (those of phenomenological pure subjectivity) do not reach final strictness and scientific status. All evidences so to say still afflicted with the remains of vague premonition, undecided anticipation, only have an intermediary cognitional value, still in need of final clarification and determination. Some cognition may well indeed *a priori*, “essentially” be correct and still relatively incomplete – even if on the other side it is an enormous progress in comparison to an *empeiria* without any principles.

Our articles on “renewal as an individually ethical and socially ethical problem”, following at the same time in this journal, will now attempt, so to say from a middle height, as this is currently the possible only way, to essentially research the pure idea of the ethical man and to work in advance for some fundamental ethics in this way.

1. The first *Kaizo*-article. First published in: *The Kaizo*, 1923, magazine 3, pages 84-92 (original text), pages 68-83 Japanese translation – Compare supplement I, page 94 on this article. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The second *Kaizo* article. First published (only in Japanese) in: *The Kaizo*, 1924, magazine 4, pages 107-116. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. \* Compare my *Logical Investigations*, I §§ 65-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. \*\* Compare loc.cit., II, 1, IV. Investigation. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. \*\*\* Compare my *Ideas on a pure Phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy*, Halle, 1913. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)